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Abstract: Aldrich-McKelvey scaling is a powerful method that corrects for differential-
item functioning (DIF) in estimating the positions of political stimuli (e.g., parties and can-
didates) and survey respondents along a latent policy dimension from issue scale data. DIF
arises when respondents interpret issue scales (like the standard liberal-conservative scale)
differently and distort their placements of the stimuli and themselves. We develop a Bayesian
implementation of the classical maximum likelihood Aldrich-McKelvey scaling method that
overcomes some important shortcomings in the classical procedure. We then apply this
method to study citizens’ ideological preferences and perceptions using data from the 2004-
2012 American National Election Studies and the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election
Study. Our findings indicate that DIF biases self-placements on the liberal-conservative scale
in a way that understates the extent of polarization in the contemporary American electorate
and that citizens have remarkably accurate perceptions of the ideological positions of Sena-
tors and Senate candidates.
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1 Introduction
It is difficult to overstate the extent to which our knowledge of the political world has
benefitted from survey research. Surveys like the American National Election Studies have
made it possible for countless scholars to investigate questions of vital importance to the
functioning of our democratic society. For example, do citizens possess spatial awareness—
that is, an understanding of their position relative to other political figures on important
dimensions of political competition? If citizens do possess this spatial awareness, then at
the individual level, citizens can use this information to make informed decisions about
their own political futures including holding current officeholders accountable for perceived
policy-oriented transgressions. Further, individual preferences can provide a sense of the
distribution of preferences in the aggregate. Reliable information of this sort is required to
assess the extent and character of popular representation. One of the most salient questions
in contemporary American politics concerns the extent to which the mass public can be
characterized as ideologically polarized. Notably, Fiorina, Abrams and Pope (2011) have
used survey data to argue that the American public has remained centrist in the aggregate
while their political representatives have become decidedly non-centrist (McCarty, Poole and
Rosenthal, 2006).
Unfortunately, survey responses can obscure, rather than illuminate, the true nature of
the political world. Both Brady (1985) and King et al. (2004) have identified a problem with
issue scales (the main source of data for answering these types of questions) called differen-
tial item-functioning (DIF). DIF (or interpersonal incomparability) arises when respondents
interpret and answer survey items such as issue scales differently. Two respondents with the
same opinion may nonetheless place themselves at different positions on the scale, or two
respondents with different opinions may locate themselves at the same position. While this
problem may seem to be largely methodological in nature, we show below that it has some
important substantive implications. In particular, we might expect that many respondents
place both themselves and their preferred candidate/party in the middle of the scale while
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pushing stimuli they dislike toward the extremes. For instance, a conservative respondent
may place the Democratic Party on the far left edge of the scale, while a liberal respon-
dent will be more likely to perceive the Democratic Party and herself as centrist. This
would have the effect of making the electorate artificially appear less polarized. DIF of this
form also limits comparability between respondents across ideologically disparate electoral
or geographic units like states and hinders our ability to evaluate the accuracy of citizens’
ideological perceptions of their representatives.
Aldrich and McKelvey’s (1977) pathbreaking solution to the problem of DIF is to treat
raw placements as linear distortions of the “true” positions of the stimuli (e.g., political
parties and candidates). By estimating each respondent’s perceptual distortion parameters
(the intercept/“shift” and weight/“stretch” terms), it is possible to recover the underlying
locations of the stimuli as well as the respondents (if self-placement questions are included
in the survey) on a common latent dimension from issue scale data. The Aldrich-McKelvey
(A-M) method was one of the first statistical scaling procedures based upon the spatial
(geometric) theory of choice and judgment. Nearly forty years after its development, political
scientists continue to employ A-M scaling to study a variety of political contexts (e.g., Saiegh,
2009; Hollibaugh, Rothenberg and Rulison, 2013; Lo, Proksch and Gschwend, 2014). Gary
King and Jonathan Wand have also introduced a DIF-correction method based on anchoring
vignettes that is equivalent to a nonparametric version of the A-M model (King and Wand,
2007; Wand, 2013).1
However, A-M scaling has been an underutilized tool in general the estimation of spatial
models of public opinion and in particular to answer the important questions posed above. In
part, oversight of the A-M scaling method can be attributed to the technical complexities of
actually running the classical maximum likelihood (ML) A-M procedure, which was originally
written in FORTRAN code and has only recently been made available as an R function in the
1“Anchoring vignettes” are stimuli that are familiar to all of the respondents. These can be real (e.g., the
Republican Party or President Obama) or fictional. For example, Bakker, Jolly, Polk and Poole (2014) ask
expert informants to place fictional parties with hypothetical platforms on a left-right scale, and use these
placements to bridge across European countries.
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basicspace package (Poole et al., 2013). There are also some important limitations to
classical A-M scaling. First, it does not allow for the inclusion of individuals with missing
responses. This becomes problematic not only because of high rates of missing data in public
opinion surveys, but also when it becomes necessary to “bridge” across data from different
respondent groups (e.g., nations or congressional districts) and/or time periods since missing
data will necessarily be present. Second, uncertainty bounds for the stimuli positions are not
directly estimated but can be approximated via bootstrapping. More importantly, though,
there is no satisfactory way to estimate uncertainty in the individual distortion parameters
and, hence, in the respondent ideal points using classical A-M scaling.
In this paper, we address these deficiencies by developing a Bayesian implementation of
the A-M scaling mod el. In this setup, missing data are easily accommodated and Markov
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods produce more realistic measures of uncertainty (i.e.,
95% credible intervals) for both the stimuli and the distortion parameters. These measures
facilitate the appropriate use of A-M results in outside models by allowing the researcher to
incorporate uncertainty inherent in estimates of latent variables. Our adaptation preserves
the underlying A-M model while providing a more attractive means of estimation. This
innovation allows us to provide more rigorous and appropriate answers to the questions
posed above and will hopefully allow other scholars using issue scale data to do the same.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first elaborate on the problem of DIF, how it sys-
tematically biases survey responses, and how the A-M model solves this problem. We then
develop a version of this model that is akin to a re-indexed Bayesian factor model (see Quinn,
2004 and Jackman, 2009) that can be estimated using standard MCMC methods. The sub-
sequent sections apply the method to two important questions in the study of American
politics. First, we present evidence that respondents bias their liberal-conservative ideo-
logical scale placements such that they place themselves and their preferred candidate(s)
near the middle while pushing opposing candidates to the extremes. In Sections 4 and 5,
we demonstrate that this bias has important substantive implications for the study of citi-
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zens’ ideological preferences and perceptions. First, we show that DIF understates the true
extent of polarization in liberal-conservative self-placement data. Second, we employ the
Bayesian A-M method to address the problem of comparability in respondent perceptions
across states. Correcting for DIF allows us to make valid cross-state comparisons of respon-
dents’ ideological perceptions of Senators and Senatorial candidates and assess how they
compare with alternative measures based on roll call votes and campaign contributions.2
Section 6 concludes with an assessment of how Bayesian A-M scaling can contribute to the
field of ideal point estimation and scaling methodology.
2 Differential Item Functioning in Survey Responses
and the Aldrich-McKelvey Solution
Placing oneself and political stimuli like parties or candidates on an issue scale is a task
of perception, and there are many ways in which survey respondents’ perceptions can be
systematically distorted. First, ideological centrists and extremists view the political world
differently, even if they agree on the ordering of stimuli on a policy dimension. Extremists
have more intense, sharply peaked utility functions and perceive greater distance between
themselves and the alternatives (Sherif and Hovland, 1961; Carroll et al., 2013). Conse-
quently, ideological extremists who view all parties or candidates as insufficiently liberal or
conservative should be inclined to push the stimuli toward one end of the scale. Consider,
for example, a far left activist and and a far right activist. Both might agree that President
Obama is to the left of Mitt Romney. But the far left activist may perceive Romney to be
on the far-right and Obama to be moderate or even slightly conservative. Conversely, the
far right activist is likely to view Obama as extremely liberal and Romney as a centrist.
Second, because the term “moderate” has a positive connotation in politics (i.e., it implies
2Recent work by Jacoby and Armstrong (2014) indicates that citizens can and do use ideology to evaluate
national candidates and elected officials, and Bayesian A-M scaling allows us to assess this claim at the state
level.
6
being reasonable, sensible, objective, etc.), we expect that respondents will be more likely
to use that term or position to describe themselves and their preferred candidate and party,
even if those stimuli are decidedly non-centrist. There has been a considerable amount of
work that has examined why Americans favor the “conservative” over the “liberal” label
(e.g., Free and Cantril, 1967; Ellis and Stimson, 2012), but less attention has been paid to
whether social desirability bias leads to overuse of the middle position of issue scales. We
hypothesize that many respondents place themselves and their preferred candidate/party
near the middle of the scale while pushing the opposing candidate/party closer to either of
the ends of the scale.
Finally, respondents also distort their issue scale placements by reversing the ordering
of stimuli. This would include, for instance, placing the Republican Party to the left of
the Democratic Party. This behavior is concentrated among those with low levels of polit-
ical sophistication (Palfrey and Poole, 1987), although its frequency (both on the liberal-
conservative scale and several specific issue scales) has declined over recent decades (Leven-
dusky, 2009).
Aldrich and McKelvey (1977) develop a scaling method that diagnoses and corrects for
these types of distortions by modeling respondents’ placements as a linear function of the
true location of the stimuli and two individual-specific transformation parameters. The
first parameter (the α or intercept term) allows for shifts in the reported placements to
the left or right. The second parameter (the β or weight term) expands or contracts the
reported placements on the scale, reversing them when β is negative. Hence, respondents
with negative weight terms (i.e., βi < 0) possess lower levels of political information than
respondents with positive weights.3
The A-M model is presented in equation (1). Let zij be the reported placement of stimulus
3We provide the results of several tests in support of this claim in the Supporting Information/
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j (j = 1, . . . , q) by individual i (i = 1, . . . , n):
zij = αi + βiζj + uij (1)
where ζj is the true position of stimuli j, αi is the intercept/“shift” term, βi is the weight
or “stretch” term, and uij satisfies the usual Gauss-Markov assumptions of zero mean, ho-
moscedasticity, and independence (Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977, p. 113).
As noted above, the A-M model has traditionally been estimated in a maximum like-
lihood (ML) framework, which has two important deficiencies. First, it does not estimate
uncertainty in the point estimates. Though a bootstrapping scheme can be used to develop
uncertainty bounds for the stimuli estimates, it remains infeasible to calculate uncertainty
estimates for the individual distortion parameters. As we show in the next section, this
precludes the estimation of uncertainty bounds for the respondent ideal points. Second, the
ML method does not allow for the inclusion of respondents with missing values. Not only
does this waste a lot of usable data (e.g., a respondent who places all but one of the stimuli),
but it also prevents the use of “bridged” issue scale data in which respondents are asked to
place only some of the stimuli. For instance, respondents in different states or congressional
districts may be asked to place their representatives as well as some common stimuli (e.g.,
the Democratic Party) on an issue scale. Theoretically, the common stimuli can be used
to bridge across regions or time to place all of the stimuli on a common scale, and this
has been implemented in other applications (Poole, 2005; Shor and McCarty, 2011; Bakker,
Jolly, Polk and Poole, 2014). However, because respondents are not asked to place all of the
stimuli, missing values will be present for every respondent and the existing method cannot
accommodate this data structure. These issues motivate our development of a Bayesian
method of estimating the A-M scaling model.
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2.1 The Bayesian Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling Model
Rather than employ a loss function to develop a Bayesian implementation of the A-M model,
we instead estimate a variation of a Bayesian factor model (e.g., Quinn, 2004; Jackman, 2009,
chap. 9). In the standard factor model set-up, the latent variable or factor is indexed by
individual whereas the factor loadings are held constant across all observations. The A-M
procedure, however, reverses this indexing. That is, the factor loadings are allowed to vary
across individuals whereas the latent variable is held constant. This follows directly from
the discussion above in that the true positions of the stimuli are the same for all respondents
whereas the parameters that map the respondents’ perceived placements of the stimuli to
the true placements are specific to the individual.
While Aldrich and McKelvey (1977) solve for ζj first and subsequently calculate the
individual transformation parameters αi and βi, in the Bayesian framework we can estimate
both quantities simultaneously. As Jackman (2000) describes, in Bayesian estimation all
unknown quantities are treated in the same manner. Once the model is specified, we sample
from the joint posterior distribution of all unknown parameters, whether they are missing
data values, regression parameters, latent variable scores, or any other unknown. In our
model, we sample from the joint posterior for the individual transformation parameters and
the true stimuli positions. Identification of this model is achieved through the priors on the
unknown parameters.4 Given that we sample directly from the posterior distribution of the
unknowns, it is trivial to compute standard errors for these estimates.
The Bayesian A-M model assumes that the zij (the perceived location of stimulus j by
individual i) are distributed in the following manner:
4For a more complete discussion on identification and estimation of Bayesian latent variable models, see
Jackman (2000, 2001).
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zij ∼ N(µij, τij) (2)
µij = αi + βiζj (3)
τij = τiτj (4)
We employ non-informative uniform priors for the individual transformation parameters
αi and βi:
αi ∼ U(−100, 100) (5)
βi ∼ U(−100, 100) (6)
Standard normal priors are used for the estimates of the stimuli positions (ζj). The
polarity of the scale can be set by constraining a liberal stimulus to lie between -1.1 and
-0.9 [i.e., N(0, 1)T (−1.1,−0.9)] and a conservative stimulus to lie between 0.9 and 1.1. This
is adapted from the standard −1/+1 constraint that is sufficient for identification (Clinton,
Jackman and Rivers, 2004), but also allows for uncertainty in the point estimates of these
stimuli.
ζj ∼ N(0, 1) (7)
Finally, unique stimuli and respondent error variances are estimated to allow for het-
eroskedastic error. Diffuse inverse Gamma priors are used for both the stimuli and respondent-
specific precision terms (τj and τi, respectively). Inverse Gamma hyperpriors are also placed
on the shape and scale parameters of the inverse Gamma priors for the τi terms. This has
the practical effect of introducing exchangeability between the τi parameters.
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τj ∼ Gamma(0.1, 0.1) (8)
τi ∼ Gamma(ν, ω) (9)
ν ∼ Gamma(0.1, 0.1) (10)
ω ∼ Gamma(0.1, 0.1) (11)
In the examples used in this paper, MCMC estimation of the model is conducted using
JAGS (Just Another Gibbs Sampler) and the R package rjags (Plummer, 2003, 2013). We
require that respondents provide placements of at least three stimuli to be included in the
analysis. In each case, we run two chains, discarding the first 50, 000 iterations as a burn-
in period and summarizing the results of the remaining 10, 000 iterations with a thinning
interval of 10. The chains show strong evidence of convergence according to the Gelman-
Rubin diagnostic, the Geweke diagnostic, and the unimodality of the posterior distributions.
Finally, equation (12) uses respondents’ self-placements (zi(self)) and estimated distortion
parameters (αi and βi) to calculate their ideal point (xi) in the same metric as the estimated
stimuli positions:
xi =
zi(self) − αi
βi
(12)
In the Bayesian framework, this means that we take successive draws from the posterior
densities of αi and βi to calculate a distribution for individual i’s ideal point. This allows
uncertainty in the estimates of αi and βi to flow through to the ideal point estimates, another
advantage of the Bayesian A-M procedure. Note in equation (12) that lim
βi→0
=∞, and so we
use the median value as the point estimate of the respondent positions since the median will
be more robust to long tails produced when posterior draws of βi are very close to 0.
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3 Diagnosing Differential Item Functioning in Survey
Responses
Do respondents place themselves and their favored candidate(s) at more moderate positions
while pushing opposing candidates(s) toward the extremes? We address this question using
data from the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES) and the 2010 Cooperative
Congressional Election Study (CCES). To recap, the A-M model treats respondents’ place-
ments as a function of the “true” positions of the stimuli and a set of individual-specific
linear mapping parameters (that is, zij = αi + βiζj + uij). In substantive terms, this means
that positive values of α (the intercept or “shift” term) indicate that the respondent places
the stimuli (and by extension, herself) too high on the scale, while negative α values indicate
the opposite. For example, on the standard liberal-conservative scale in which higher values
denote greater conservatism, positive α values indicate that the respondent is over-using
the conservative side of the scale (pushing stimuli too far rightward) and negative α values
indicate that the respondent is over-using the liberal end of the scale (pushing stimuli too far
leftward). We would expect, then, that liberal respondents would have higher and positive
α values than conservative respondents, who would have lower and negative α values.
Tables 1–2 help illustrate the substantive meaning of the α values from A-M scaling.
These provide four (two Republicans and two Democrats) 2012 ANES respondents’ raw-
placements of their party and themselves on the seven-point liberal-conservative scale, the
posterior mean of their α term (with 95% credible interval), and their open-ended answers
about what they dislike about their party. All of these respondents criticize their party
for being too moderate, a sentiment that should be reflected in their ideological placements
and their α term. This is precisely what we see: both Republicans have negative α values
(meaning they rate the stimuli as too liberal), while both Democrats have positive α values
(meaning they rate the stimuli as too conservative). Presumably, these respondents are also
understating the extent of their own liberalism or conservatism.
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We next more systematically consider the relationship between respondents’ α values
and their ideological and partisan preferences. First, Figure 1 shows the distribution of
respondents’ mean α values across partisan and ideological groups in the 2012 ANES. As
we would expect, the α means of Democrats and self-identified liberals tend to be positive
(meaning that they overuse the conservative end of scale) while the α means of Republicans
and self-identified conservatives tend to be negative (meaning that they overuse the liberal
end of the scale).5 The importance of this result is that, in most cases, liberal Democrats
and conservative Republicans are understating their own ideological extremism in their self-
placements.
It is also important to note from Figure 1 that while the α estimates for independents
and self-identified moderates are centered at 0, there is also high variance. That is, there are
a considerable number of respondents in both groups with non-negligible positive or negative
α means whose own ideological placements need to be shifted to the left or right. These
are illusory moderates. They may perceive themselves as moderate, but their ratings of
political stimuli calls their self-placements into question. While Treier and Hillygus (2009)
have argued that moderate identification can mask underlying cross-pressures between liberal
and conservative attitudes on economic and social issues, our findings indicate that it may
also hide more extreme positions on a single liberal-conservative dimension.
Of course, Figure 1 is subject to the criticism that we are using a measure (ideological
self-placement) that is itself biased by DIF to diagnose DIF. To address this problem, we turn
to data from the 2010 CCES to develop an alternative measure of ideological position and
examine its relationship to respondents’ mean α values.6 The 2010 CCES asked respondents
whether they support or oppose a series of eight policy proposals also voted on by the 111th
US Congress.7 Because respondents must choose either support or oppose, DIF of the kind
5The correlation between partisanship and mean α value is -0.37 and between ideological self-placement
and mean α value is -0.38.
6To ease the computational burden, we randomly select with replacement 200 respondents from each
state.
7These include the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the 2009 stimulus) [CC332A], the the State
Children’s Health Insurance Program [CC332B], the American Clean Energy and Security Act [CC332C], the
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that we are concerned about is not problematic. We simply use the proportion of non-missing
responses that are conservative as our alternative ideological measure.
Table 3 reports the results of separate OLS regressions of respondent mean α values onto
ideological self-placements and the measure based on roll call votes using the 2010 CCES
data. As in Figure 1 and consistent with the hypothesized relationship, both ideological
variables exert a negative effect on the α term. In fact, respondent ideology as measured
using their roll call vote preferences has an even stronger relationship with the mean α values
than the raw self-placements. This provides strong evidence that respondents’ ideological
positions systematically influence their issue scale placements, with more liberal respondents
pushing stimuli too far rightward and conservative respondents doing just the opposite.
Moreover, 34% of self-identified moderates (570 / 1663) are in the most liberal or most
conservative quartiles of the ideological measure constructed from the roll call votes.
4 Re-Considering the Distribution of Citizens’ Ideo-
logical Preferences
We have thus far shown that respondents bias their placements on issue scales in systematic
ways that can be diagnosed and corrected for by A-M scaling. This section proceeds with an
assessment of how DIF affects survey respondents’ self-placements on the standard liberal-
conservative scale and our use of this data to analyze the distribution of mass ideological
preferences. In particular, this data has obvious relevance to the study of polarization in the
contemporary American electorate and is frequently used to examine whether citizens have
followed elites and become more extreme in their own policy preferences. A quick review of
this data suggests not: since 1972, the modal response to the American National Election
Comprehensive Health Reform Act (the Affordable Care Act) [CC332D], the appointment of Elena Kagan
to the US Supreme Court [CC332E], the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill [CC332F], repealing Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell [CC332G], and federal funding of embryonic stem cell research [CC332I]. Cronbach’s α for these
eight items is 0.91 (the Kuder-Richardson coefficient of reliability [KR-20], an analogue of Cronbach’s α for
dichotomous responses, is also 0.91).
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Studies (ANES) liberal-conservative scale has been the moderate category, with only a small
percentage of respondents rating themselves as “extreme liberals” or “extreme conservatives”
(ANES, 2010). The same pattern holds up with most other scales concerning specific policy
issues like government spending or abortion.
Some, most notably Fiorina, Abrams and Pope (2011), have used this data to argue
that the American public has remained centrist in the face of intense elite polarization (see
also Fiorina and Abrams, 2008, 2012 and DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson, 1996). Others have
pointed out that the distribution of respondents becomes more bimodal when isolating actual
voters or politically informed/engaged citizens (e.g., Palfrey and Poole, 1987; Abramowitz
and Saunders, 2008; Abramowitz, 2010; Lauderdale, 2013). These types of respondents
have more polarized preferences as well as greater influence in the political arena. For the
public as a whole, though, self-placements on most of these issue scales—particularly the
liberal-conservative scale—follow an approximate bell curve pattern, and this has important
implications for measuring polarization in the mass public. Hetherington and Weiler (2009,
p. 19), for example, write that:
Fiorina quite convincingly shows that Americans’ issue preferences have been and
remain generally moderate (see also Evans 2003). A key piece of his evidence is
the National Election Study’s (NES) ideological self-placement question. When
people are asked to place themselves on a 7-point scale from extremely liberal at
one end to extremely conservative at the other with moderate, middle of the road
at the midpoint, about 50 percent of Americans either characterize themselves
as moderate or are unable to place themselves on the scale.
What is left out of this discussion, however, is an analysis of how DIF biases respondents’
self-placements on the liberal-conservative scale. Our findings in the previous section clearly
lead to the hypothesis that DIF should understate the true level of ideological polarization in
the electorate. Ideologues and partisans tend to push stimuli (including themselves) too far
to the opposite end of the scale, and many self-identified moderates are not true centrists.
These patterns stand out the 2012 ANES data. For instance, of the respondents who voted
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for Obama and provided placements of themselves and Obama on the liberal-conservative
scale, 31% (663 / 2166) rated both themselves and Obama as “moderate” or “slightly liberal.”
Among Romney voters, 21% (388 / 1622) rated themselves and Romney as “moderate” or
“slightly conservative.” The placements of respondents the former group should be moved
to left, while the placements of those in the second group should be moved rightward. The
same is also true of the 60% (997 / 1656) of Romney voters who placed Obama at the
leftmost position (“extremely liberal”) and the 32% of Obama voters who placed Romney
at the rightmost position (“extremely conservative”).
Once we correct for DIF in respondents’ placements, what does the ideological distri-
bution of the American electorate look like? Figure 2 compares the raw and Bayesian
A-M estimates of the liberal-conservative self-placement data in the 2012 ANES. The left
panel shows the distribution of respondents’ self-placements on the liberal-conservative scale.
These data paint a clear picture of a centrist electorate: the distribution follows a bell curve
pattern with a marked peak in the middle and with only a small proportion of respondents
at either extreme.
However, the Bayesian A-M ideal point estimates—shown in the right panel of Figure 2—
tell a more nuanced story about the ideological makeup of the contemporary American
electorate. The dark gray bins isolate respondents with positive mean β (the weight term)
values, meaning that they correctly placed liberal stimuli to the left of conservative stimuli.
As discussed in the previous section, we use the positive weight threshold to filter respondents
who meet a baseline level of political information
Both distributions of Bayesian A-M ideal point estimates—all respondents and only those
with positive weights—exhibit greater polarization than the raw self-placement data. The
peaks of the distributions are far flatter and extend outward to the major party presidential
candidate point estimates (shown with the “O” and “R” labels at the bottom). Indeed, a
little less than half (44%) of respondents have estimated ideal points more extreme than
Obama or Romney. We might more accurately characterize these distributions are trimodal,
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with peaks at the center and around each of the estimated candidate positions (e.g., Downey
and Huffman, 2001). Of course, we should be cautious since there is uncertainty in the these
point estimates, but at the very least these results shed doubt on the common practice of
using raw self-placement data to measure polarization. The ideological center appears to
hollow out once we account for DIF.
Indeed, the ideological distribution of respondents with positive weights clearly shows the
greatest amount of polarization, with many moderates disappearing once we remove those
who confuse the liberal and conservative labels as applied to the parties and presidential
candidates. This result is very much in line with the findings of Palfrey and Poole (1987) and
Abramowitz (2010): as we focus on more informed and engaged segments of the electorate,
we find higher levels of ideological polarization. These are the citizens with the loudest voice
in American politics, and Bayesian A-M scaling reveals the extent of their polarization.
As a final test, we adopt Levendusky and Pope’s (2011) approach of measuring polar-
ization with the overlap coefficient. The overlap coefficient measures the overlap or shared
area between two distributions; for example, between Republicans and Democrats on an
ideological dimension. Given two probability densities f and g, the overlap coefficient is
defined as
∆(f, g) =
∫
min {f(x), g(x)} dx (13)
and ranges between 0 (no overlap) to 1 (complete overlap), so that lower values indicate
higher attitudinal polarization.
We estimate the overlap coefficient using the nonparametric estimator (∆ˆ4)
8 in Equa-
tion 14 from Schmid and Schmidt (2006) and implemented in the R package overlap (Mered-
8Ridout and Linkie (2009) recommend use of this estimator when sample sizes are larger than 75.
17
ith and Ridout, 2013):
∆ˆ4 =
1
2
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
min
{
1,
gˆ(xi)
fˆ(xi)
}
+
1
m
m∑
i=1
min
{
1,
fˆ(yi)
gˆ(yi)
})
(14)
Our goal is to compare the overlap between voters supporting each of the two major
party presidential candidates in 2004, 2008, and 2012 based on each of the two measures of
liberal-conservative position: the raw self-placement data and the DIF-corrected Bayesian
A-M ideal point estimates. We use a bootstrapping approach to estimate 95% confidence
intervals for the overlap point estimates for the raw liberal-conservative self-placements,
sampling with replacement over 1,000 trials and then calculating the standard deviations of
the series of point estimates. We aggregate uncertainty in the Bayesian A-M ideal points to
develop 95% credible intervals for the overlap coefficients from these estimates. A random
draw is taken from the posterior distribution of each respondent’s ideal point, an overlap
score is computed for these draws, and the process is repeated 1,000 times.9 This gives us
a distribution of overlap coefficients, for which we calculate the 95% credible interval. The
results are summarized in Figure 3.
Across all years, the overlap between party identifiers (with leaners) and voters of the
Democratic/Republican presidential candidates is greater according to raw liberal-conservative
self-placements than the Bayesian A-M ideal point estimates. That is, after accounting for
DIF using Bayesian A-M scaling, voters are more polarized (less overlap) than when using
raw self-placement data. In all cases, the difference in overlap coefficients between the raw
self-placements and the Bayesian A-M estimates is statistically significant at conventional
levels. The differences between the two sets of overlap coefficients are also substantively large,
in no case less than 0.09 (or about an 18% decrease in overlap from the raw self-placement
data to the Bayesian A-M ideal point estimates). It is also noteworthy that the overlap point
estimates show the most pronounced drop in 2012—the most recent year studied.
9Extreme draws that are greater or less than 10/-10 are excluded from the analysis.
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5 Citizens’ Ideological Perceptions of Legislators and
Candidates
How well do voters judge the ideological positions of legislators and candidates? This ques-
tion has obvious relevance for assessing the quality of democratic representation, as the roll
call vote choices of both federal and state legislators are primarily driven by their positions
on the liberal-conservative dimension (Poole and Rosenthal, 2007; Shor and McCarty, 2011).
Hence, the vast majority of policy outcomes in Congress and state legislatures can be ex-
plained by the distribution of their members along the ideological spectrum. In order for
voters to hold representatives maximally accountable, then, they must be able to distinguish
between political actors on an ideological metric.
A number of classic works—namely, Miller and Stokes (1963) and Converse (1964)—have
established a pessimistic outlook on this question. According to this literature, most citizens
do not think ideologically and are ignorant of their representatives’ policy positions, even
on salient issues. Coupled with more recent findings that low levels of political information
continue to be widespread in the American electorate (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996),
we might conclude that ideological nuance is beyond the reach of most citizens.
However, a more recent stream of research has a more optimistic take on citizens’ ability
to gauge the ideological positions of legislators and candidates. First, survey research shows
that citizens have a better grasp of their representatives’ roll call vote behavior than com-
monly assumed (Ansolabehere and Jones, 2010), especially on salient roll call votes (Nyhan
et al., 2012). Second, moderate congressional candidates outperform extreme ones at the
ballot box, ceteris paribus (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 2001; Bonica, 2014). Po-
litical polarization has also brought ideology to the forefront of American politics, making
ideological terms and labels more accessible and producing greater recognition of policy dif-
ferences between the Democratic and Republican parties (Levendusky, 2009; Jacoby, 1995).
Certainly, the fact that so many issues now collapse onto a single liberal-conservative dimen-
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sion (Layman and Carsey, 2002) facilitates use of this dimension in the mass public. For
instance, a voter who knows a candidate holds an extreme position on a visible, “easy” issue
like abortion can reasonably infer that legislator holds strong liberal or conservative stances
on a host of other issues. This was not the case as recently as twenty years ago (Poole and
Rosenthal, 1997).
Finally, studies of campaign effects have shown that voters become better informed about
candidates’ policy stances over the course of political campaigns (Franklin, 1991; Alvarez,
1997)—including statewide party primaries (Hirano et al., 2014)—and in competitive politi-
cal environments (Jones, 2013). Voters seem to balance dual information flows from positive
and negative/attack advertising in campaigns to develop more precise inferences about the
candidates’ policy stances (Geer and Vavreck, 2014). Most importantly though, Jacoby and
Armstrong (2014) find that citizens use information about the ideological positions of po-
litical actors to make affective evaluations (i.e., using feeling thermometers) about them.
Given these results, we hypothesize that respondents will be able to ideologically differenti-
ate between Senators and Senatorial candidates of the same party and, especially, of different
parties.
We test this hypothesis using survey data from the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Elec-
tion Study (CCES). The 2010 CCES respondents were asked to place themselves, four na-
tional stimuli (President Obama, the Democratic and Republican parties, and the Tea Party)
on a seven-point liberal-conservative scale. As in Section 3, we randomly select with replace-
ment 200 respondents from each state. We analyze this data using Bayesian A-M scaling,
using the four national stimuli to “bridge” across the states. This type of data cannot be
analyzed using classical (ML) A-M scaling since respondents with missing data are excluded
from the analysis and every respondent will necessarily have missing placements (e.g., a
California respondent cannot rate a Senate candidate in New Hampshire) in this setup.
The Bayesian A-M estimates of the stimuli locations across states are directly comparable,
correcting for DIF at both the individual and statewide level. At with respondents, we expect
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liberal states to have higher α values (overstating the conservatism of stimuli) than more
conservative states. Figure 4 compares the mean placement of Obama on the seven-point
liberal-conservative scale with the mean of respondents’ α estimates across states. The state
mean α values range between -0.45 (South Dakota) and 0.31 (Vermont) and are highly
correlated with the state mean Obama placements (r = 0.91). The state α means also
correlate well with other measures of state ideology such as Obama 2008 vote percentage
(r = 0.73), with differences attributable to sampling variability. Of course, whether a state
oversamples liberal or conservative respondents is irrelevant to Bayesian A-M scaling, which
simply calculates and corrects for bias of either type. Generally, though, it is clear from
Figure 4 that liberal states like California, Hawaii, and Maryland are placing stimuli too far
to the right while states like Louisiana, South Dakota, and Oklahoma are placing stimuli
too far to the left. This has obvious implications if we wish to make meaningful cross-state
comparisons of citizens’ ideological perceptions of political figures.
To assess the validity of the ideological estimates of political stimuli based on survey
respondent placements—the BAM scores—we compare them to two external measures of
ideology based on roll call voting behavior (Common Space DW-NOMINATE Scores (Poole
and Rosenthal, 2007)) and campaign contributions (CF Scores (Bonica, 2014)).10 The com-
parison of aggregated ideological placements with legislators’ roll call voting records, in
particular, is a crucial test of the vitality of the electoral connection. As Ansolabehere and
Jones (2010)[p. 587] explain, “Very high levels of information at the individual level are not
necessary for representation to work. One need only require that the average perceptions of
constituencies square with the voting records of Representatives. The law of large numbers
would make the electorate as a whole act as if individuals were highly informed (Erikson,
MacKuen and Stimson, 2002).”
We limit our analysis to all incumbent Senators and the party nominees in 17 competitive
10We provide the Bayesian A-M point estimates and 95% credible intervals for the political stimuli in the
Supporting Information.
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Senatorial races in 2010.11 We exclude non-incumbent Senate candidates in uncompetitive
races because voters have little basis to evaluate the ideological positions of “sacrificial lamb”
candidates.
Figure 5 illustrates and reports the correlations between BAM scores, both of these
measures, and the mean of the raw placements. Because respondents clearly perceive ide-
ological polarization between Democratic and Republican stimuli, the BAM scores and the
DW-NOMINATE/CF scores are highly correlated with each other across all stimuli. A
more demanding test involves citizens’ recognition of ideological differences between stim-
uli of the same party. Figure 5 also reports the correlations between each set of measures
among only Democratic (in blue) or Republican (in red) Senators and Senatorial candidates.
These intra-party correlations remain high, especially between BAM and DW-NOMINATE
scores (r = 0.75 for Democrats and r = 0.69 for Republicans). The intra-party correlations
between BAM and CF scores are lower, but are roughly equivalent to the comparable corre-
lations between DW-NOMINATE and CF scores—two well-regarded measures of legislator
and candidate ideology.
These results are quite good, given that the BAM estimates are produced exclusively
from ordinary citizens’ ideological assessments. Of course, voters can only hold candidates
accountable for being “out of step” (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 2001; Canes-Wrone,
Brady and Cogan, 2002; Carson et al., 2010) if they recognize the relative ideological positions
of political stimuli. While a long line of literature stemming from Miller and Stokes (1963) has
demonstrated that citizens are largely unknowledgeable about the issue positions of political
elites, they also appear to be able to piece together enough information to approximate the
positions of legislators and candidates in ideological space (Hinich and Pollard, 1981; Hinich
and Munger, 1994). With a single liberal-conservative dimension structuring the behavior
of elite actors in contemporary American politics, democratic accountability requires the
11We include races in the following states that the Cook Political Report listed as “leaning” or “toss-up” in
its 1 November 2010 ratings (The Cook Political Report, 2010): Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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electorate to operate in this space. Our results provide an optimistic assessment of their
ability to do so.
Finally, we compare the BAM scores and the mean placements in order to assess the
influence of DIF on the aggregate state estimates. The two sets of scores are highly similar,
but there are some differences in the intra-party correlations. More importantly, though,
the correlation between the BAM scores and DW-NOMINATE scores (overall and among
Democratic stimuli) is higher than the correlation between the mean placements and the
DW-NOMINATE scores. Though mean placements provide a close approximation to the
BAM scores, correcting for DIF provides us with a more optimistic assessment of citizens’
abilities to judge the ideological positions of political stimuli.
It would be reasonable to expect that citizens develop ideological profiles of political
stimuli based on both their roll call votes and other factors that also influence donors to
contribute to them. As Bonica (2014) explains, “[c]ontributors are free to consider the
many ways in which candidates express their ideology beyond how they vote, such as public
speaking records, stated policy goals, endorsements, the issues they champion, authored and
cosponsored legislation, or cultural and religious values.” To test the relative influence of
both sets of factors on citizens’ ideological perceptions of political stimuli, we regress the
BAM scores of Senators and Senatorial candidates with Congressional voting records onto
DW-NOMINATE Common Space and CF scores. The OLS results are reported in Table 4,
with additional models isolating Democratic and Republican stimuli. The results indicate
that DW-NOMINATE scores exert a larger and consistently significant effect than the CF
scores on citizens’ ideological perceptions of the selected political stimuli, both overall and
within each of the parties. Of course, even though DW-NOMINATE scores are based solely
on roll call votes, we should be cautious about attributing the effect of DW-NOMINATE
scores on the BAM estimates to roll call voting specifically. Citizens may be able to use
general position-taking behavior (Mayhew, 1974) to arrive at an approximation of a leg-
islator’s roll call voting record. Some of this is behavior is captured separately by both
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DW-NOMINATE and CF scores. In addition, a little less than half of the total variance
in the BAM scores remains unexplained in the separate Democratic and Republican models
and is attributable to some combination of random error and other factors not captured by
either external measure of ideology. More work is needed, but the degree to which citizens’
perceptions of the ideological positions of legislators correspond to their actual voting history
remains striking.
6 Discussion
Scholars have long recognized the prevalence of interpersonal incomparability or DIF—a
problem that arises when respondents interpret and answer survey items in different ways—
in public opinion data (Brady, 1985; King et al., 2004; Bakker, Jolly, Polk and Poole, 2014).
DIF can have important substantive implications. As we have shown in this paper, this
includes biasing our understanding of ideological polarization in the contemporary Amer-
ican electorate or limiting the comparability of respondents’ placements of legislators and
candidates across states.
The A-M scaling method has been an effective remedy for the problem of DIF, but has
been under-utilized in political science. This owes in part to some limitations of the classical
(maximum likelihood) method; in particular, the absence of reliable uncertainty measures
and the requirement that respondents place all of the stimuli to be included in the scaling.
The Bayesian implementation of the A-M scaling model that we have presented in this paper
addresses these issues, as missing data is accommodated and measures of uncertainty are
easily ascertained and interpreted via the posterior densities of the parameters.
We hope that the development of Bayesian A-M scaling will spark renewed interest in
applying the A-M model to analyze public opinion or other types of survey data. As we
have detailed, the problem of DIF is especially acute when studying polarization in the mass
electorate. Many respondents skew the space leftward or rightward, often placing placing
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themselves and their preferred candidate/party too close to the middle of the scale and/or
pushing the opposing candidate/party too far toward the extremes of the scale. Once we
account for this phenomenon and estimate corrected ideal points for the respondents, the
contemporary American electorate appears to be considerably more ideologically polarized
than would be inferred by simply looking at the distribution of raw self-placements on the
liberal-conservative scale.
We do not mean to assert that our findings are a silver bullet that the contemporary
American electorate is indeed polarized. Any single survey item remains contaminated with
measurement error—even after correcting for DIF—and multiple items are preferable when
measuring a latent concept like ideology (Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder Jr., 2008).
Accordingly, future work might adapt Bayesian A-M scaling to develop ideological scores
that adjust for DIF across multiple issue scales. However, the liberal-conservative scale,
in particular, is an efficient summary measure of citizens’ ideological positions: one that is
strongly related to a range of political attitudes and behaviors (Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). It
seems reasonable to assume that this scale will remain prevalent in public opinion research,
but we would do well to recognize its limitations (see also Treier and Hillygus 2009). For
instance, liberal-conservative self-placement data is frequently marshalled to support the
claim that the American electorate is predominately centrist. Our results indicate that this
is largely an artifact of DIF.
Bayesian A-M scaling is also a powerful method for generating estimates of the ideological
positions of political stimuli from mass survey responses. Citizens have been shown to be
quite adept at placing political figures and groups on ideological and issue scales (Brady and
Sniderman, 1985), a proposition supported by our results. Indeed, our results indicate that
citizens hold hold perceptions of Senators and Senatorial candidates that are very much in
line with their ideological locations as measured by roll call voting or campaign contributions.
The implication that political elites and the electorate effectively communicate over a single
ideological dimension (Hinich and Munger, 1994; Aldrich and Freeze, 2011) is certainly one
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deserving of future work.
Moreover, this type of perceptual data has never been more widespread. For example, the
Cooperative Congressional Election Study has included placement questions for congressional
candidates since its inception in 2006. Internationally, surveys such as the European Election
Study and the Comparative Study of Electoral System have continued to expand the number
of countries in which they conduct interviews and the number of parties and candidates that
respondents are asked to evaluate. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2014) has
been innovative in using “anchoring vignettes”—descriptions of fictional parties’ platforms—
to bridge across experts’ placements of parties in different countries when common stimuli
do not exist. Future work using Bayesian A-M scaling could likely make use of this and other
surveys that include a larger number of political figures and parties for respondent to place,
with the benefit that the individual distortion parameters (and therefore, the respondent
ideal points) are more precisely estimated as additional stimuli are included.
We think other research opportunities abound using estimates of stimuli ideological posi-
tions from respondent placements. For example, while the relationship between the Bayesian
A-M stimuli estimates and external measures of ideology (the DW-NOMINATE and CF
scores) appears to be strong, it is not perfect. Why are some stimuli perceived to be more
or less ideologically extreme than is indicated by their legislative record or contributor be-
havior? Are these the deviations random noise or the result of ideological maneuvering?
Are placements more accurate (and polarized) during campaign seasons? The results from
Bayesian A-M scaling can be used to address these and other questions critical to democratic
accountability.
26
References
Abramowitz, Alan I. 2010. The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and
American Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Abramowitz, Alan I. and Kyle L. Saunders. 2008. “Is Polarization a Myth?” Journal of
Politics 70(2):542–555.
Aldrich, John H. and Melanie Freeze. 2011. Political Participation, Polarization, and Public
Opinion: Activism and the Merging of Partisan and Ideological Polarization. In Facing
the Challenge of Democracy: Explorations in the Analysis of Public Opinion and Political
Participation, ed. Paul M. Sniderman and Benjamin Highton. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press pp. 185–206.
Aldrich, John H. and Richard D. McKelvey. 1977. “A Method of Scaling with Applications to
the 1968 and 1972 Presidential Elections.” American Political Science Review 71(1):111–
130.
Alvarez, R. Michael. 1997. Information and Elections. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press.
American National Election Studies. 2010. Time Series Cumulative Data File [dataset].
Stanford University and the University of Michigan [producers and distributors].
URL: http://electionstudies.org
Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, Jr. and Charles Stewart, III. 2001. “Candidate
Positioning in U.S. House Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 45(1):136–159.
Ansolabehere, Stephen, Jonathan Rodden and James M. Snyder Jr. 2008. “The Strength
of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint,
and Issue Voting.” American Political Science Review 102(2):215–232.
Ansolabehere, Stephen and Philip Edward Jones. 2010. “Constituents Responses to Con-
gressional Roll-Call Voting.” American Journal of Political Science 54(3):583–597.
Bakker, Ryan, Catherine de Vries, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks,
Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen and Milada Anna Vachudova. 2014. “Mea-
suring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999-2010.”
Forthcoming, Party Politics.
Bakker, Ryan, Seth Jolly, Jon Polk and Keith T. Poole. 2014. “The European Common
Space: Using Anchoring Vignettes to Scale Party Positions across Europe.” Forthcoming,
Journal of Politics.
Bonica, Adam. 2014. “Mapping the Ideological Marketplace.” American Journal of Political
Science 58(2):367–386.
Brady, Henry E. 1985. “The Perils of Survey Research: Inter-Personally Incomparable
Responses.” Political Methodology 11(3-4):269–291.
27
Brady, Henry E. and Paul M. Sniderman. 1985. “Attitude Attribution: A Group Basis for
Political Reasoning.” American Political Science Review 79(4):1061–1078.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, David W. Brady and John F. Cogan. 2002. “Out of Step, Out of
Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members’ Voting.” American Political Science
Review 96(1):127–140.
Carroll, Royce, Jeffrey B. Lewis, James Lo, Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 2013.
“The Structure of Utility in Spatial Models of Voting.” American Journal of Political
Science 57(4):1008–1028.
Carson, Jamie L., Gregory Koger, Matthew J. Lebo and Everett Young. 2010. “The Electoral
Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress.” American Journal of Political Science 54(3):598–616.
Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman and Douglas Rivers. 2004. “The Statistical Analysis of Roll
Call Data.” American Political Science Review 98(2):355–370.
Converse, Philip E. 1964. The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In Ideology and
Discontent, ed. David E. Apter. New York: Free Press pp. 206–261.
Delli Carpini, Michael X. and Scott Keeter. 1996. What Americans Know About Politics and
Why It Matters. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
DiMaggio, Paul, John Evans and Bethany Bryson. 1996. “Have American’s Social Attitudes
Become More Polarized?” American Journal of Sociology 102(3):690–755.
Downey, Dennis J. and Matt L. Huffman. 2001. “Attitudinal Polarization and Trimodal Dis-
tributions: Measurement Problems and Theoretical Implications.” Social Science Quar-
terly 82(3):494–505.
Ellis, Christopher and James A. Stimson. 2012. Ideology in America. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. MacKuen and James A. Stimson. 2002. The Macro Polity.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Evans, John H. 2003. “Have Americans’ Attitudes Become More Polarized? - An Update.”
Social Science Quarterly 84(1):71–90.
Fiorina, Morris P. and Samuel J. Abrams. 2008. “Political Polarization in the American
Public.” Annual Review of Political Science 11:563–588.
Fiorina, Morris P. and Samuel J. Abrams. 2012. Disconnect: The Breakdown of Represen-
tation in American Politics. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams and Jeremy C. Pope. 2011. Culture War? The Myth
of a Polarized America. 3rd ed. New York: Pearson Longman.
Franklin, Charles H. 1991. “Eschewing Obfuscation? Campaigns and the Perception of U.S.
Senate Incumbents.” American Political Science Review 85(4):1193–1214.
28
Free, Lloyd and Hadley Cantril. 1967. The Political Beliefs of Americans. New York: Free
Press.
Geer, John G. and Lynn Vavreck. 2014. “Negativity, Information, and Candidate Position-
Taking.” Political Communication 31(2):218–236.
Hetherington, Marc J. and Jonathan D. Weiler. 2009. Authoritarianism and Polarization in
American Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hinich, Melvin J. and Michael C. Munger. 1994. Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Hinich, Melvin J. and Walker Pollard. 1981. “A New Approach to the Spatial Theory of
Electoral Competition.” American Journal of Political Science 25(2):323–341.
Hirano, Shigeo, Gabriel S. Lenz, Maksim Pinkovskiy and James M. Snyder. 2014. “Voter
Learning in State Primary Elections.” Forthcoming, American Journal of Political Science.
Hollibaugh, Gary E., Lawrence S. Rothenberg and Kristin K. Rulison. 2013. “Does It Really
Hurt to Be Out of Step?” Political Research Quarterly 66(4):856–867.
Jackman, Simon. 2000. “Estimation and Inference Are Missing Data Problems: Unifying
Social Science Statistics via Bayesian Simulation.” Political Analysis 8(4):307–332.
Jackman, Simon. 2001. “Multidimensional Analysis of Roll Call Data via Bayesian Sim-
ulation: Identification, Estimation, Inference, and Model Checking.” Political Analysis
9(3):227–241.
Jackman, Simon. 2009. Bayesian Analysis for the Social Sciences. New York: Wiley.
Jacoby, William G. 1995. “The Structure of Ideological Thinking in the American Elec-
torate.” American Journal of Political Science 39(2):314–335.
Jacoby, William G. and David A. Armstrong. 2014. “Bootstrap Confidence Regions for
Multidimensional Scaling Solutions.” American Journal of Political Science 58(1):264–
278.
Jones, Philip Edward. 2013. “The Effect of Political Competition on Democratic Account-
ability.” Political Behavior 35(3):481–515.
King, Gary, Christopher J.L. Murray, Joshua A. Salomon and Ajay Tandon. 2004. “Enhanc-
ing the Validity and Cross-Cultural Comparability of Measurement in Survey Research.”
American Political Science Review 98(1):191–207.
King, Gary and Jonathan Wand. 2007. “Comparing Incomparable Survey Responses: Eval-
uating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettes.” Political Analysis 15(1):46–66.
Lauderdale, Benjamin E. 2013. “Does Inattention to Political Debate Explain the Polariza-
tion Gap between the U.S. Congress and Public?” Public Opinion Quarterly 77(S1):2–23.
29
Layman, Geoffrey C. and Thomas M. Carsey. 2002. “Party Polarization and ”Conflict Exten-
sion” in the American Electorate.” American Journal of Political Science 46(4):786–802.
Levendusky, Matthew. 2009. The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Con-
servatives Became Republicans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Levendusky, Matthew S. and Jeremy C. Pope. 2011. “Red States vs. Blue States: Going
Beyond the Mean.” Public Opinion Quarterly 75(2):227–248.
Lewis-Beck, Michael S., William G. Jacoby, Helmut Norpoth and Herbert F. Weisberg. 2008.
The American Voter Revisited. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Lo, James, Sven-Oliver Proksch and Thomas Gschwend. 2014. “A Common Left-Right Scale
for Voters and Parties in Europe.” Political Analysis 22(2):205–223.
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized America: The
Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Meredith, Mike and Martin Ridout. 2013. overlap: Estimates of Coefficient of Overlapping
for Animal Activity Patterns. R package version 0.2.0.
URL: http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=overlap
Miller, Warren E. and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. “Constituency Influence in Congress.” Amer-
ican Political Science Review 57(1):45–56.
Nyhan, Brendan, Eric McGhee, John Sides, Seth Masket and Steven Greene. 2012. “One
Vote Out of Step? The Effects of Salient Roll Call Votes in the 2010 Election.” American
Politics Research 40(5):844–879.
Palfrey, Thomas R. and Keith T. Poole. 1987. “The Relationship between Information,
Ideology, and Voting Behavior.” American Journal of Political Science 31(3):511–530.
Plummer, Martyn. 2003. JAGS: A Program for Analysis of Bayesian Graphical Models Using
Gibbs Sampling.
URL: http://mcmc-jags.sourceforge.net/
Plummer, Martyn. 2013. rjags: Bayesian Graphical Models using MCMC. R package version
3-10.
URL: http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=rjags
Poole, Keith, Howard Rosenthal, Jeffrey Lewis, James Lo and Royce Carroll. 2013. basic-
space: A Package to Recover a Basic Space from Issue Scales. R package version 0.07.
URL: http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=basicspace
Poole, Keith T. 2005. Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
30
Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. Congress: A Political-Economic History of
Roll Call Voting. New York: Oxford University Press.
Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 2007. Ideology and Congress. New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction.
Quinn, Kevin M. 2004. “Bayesian Factor Analysis for Mixed Ordinal and Continuous Re-
sponses.” Political Analysis 12(4):338–353.
Ridout, Martin S. and Matthew Linkie. 2009. “Estimating Overlap of Daily Activity Patterns
from Camera Trap Data.” Journal of Agricultural, Biological, and Environmental Statistics
14(3):322–337.
Saiegh, Sebastian M. 2009. “Recovering a Basic Space from Elite Surveys: Evidence from
Latin America.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 34(1):117–145.
Schmid, Friedrich and Axel Schmidt. 2006. “Nonparametric Estimation of the Coefficient
of Overlapping—Theory and Empirical Application.” Computational Statistics & Data
Analysis 50(6):1583–1596.
Sherif, Muzafer and Carl I. Hovland. 1961. Social Judgment: Assimilation and Contrast
Effects in Communication and Attitude Change. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Shor, Boris and Nolan McCarty. 2011. “The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures.”
American Political Science Review 105(3):530–551.
The Cook Political Report. 2010. 2010 Senate Race Rankings (November 1, 2010).
URL: http://cookpolitical.com/charts/senate/raceratings 2010−11−01 12−08−06.php
Treier, Shawn and D. Sunshine Hillygus. 2009. “The Nature of Political Ideology in the
Contemporary Electorate.” Public Opinion Quarterly 73(4):679–703.
Wand, Jonathan. 2013. “Credible Comparisons Using Interpersonally Incomparable Data:
Nonparametric Scales with Anchoring Vignettes.” American Journal of Political Science
57(1):249–262.
31
Table 1: α Values for Selected Republican Respondents
ANES Republican Self α Mean Dislike about
Case ID Party Placement Placement [95% CI] Republican Party
17 4 6 -1.25 Don’t like the Republican
[-1.89, -0.64] Party members that claim
to be conservative but
really are not, called [RINOs].
5479 4 7 -1.80 They are too liberal; not
[-2.51, -1.15] conservative enough.
Table 2: α Values for Selected Democratic Respondents
ANES Democratic Self α Mean Dislikes about
Case ID Party Placement Placement [95% CI] Democratic Party
5546 6 2 1.98 They are just in support of
[1.20, 2.78] capitalism and big business as
Republicans and continually alienate
the left and shift to the right
rather than forcing the Republicans
to move left and speak honestly
about their policies.
5602 5 3 1.99 They won’t stand up to big pharma
[1.48, 2.52] companies, or big banks, or giant
corporations like I wish they would.
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Table 3: Respondent Ideological Position and Mean α Values in the 2010 Coop-
erative Congressional Election Study
Self-Placement Roll Call Votes
β β
Ideology −0.26∗ -0.59 −1.56∗ -0.70
(0.00) (0.02)
(Intercept) 0.01 0.58∗
(0.01) (0.01)
N 9865 9997
R2 0.34 0.49
adj. R2 0.34 0.49
Resid. sd 0.69 0.61
Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in
parentheses
β are standardized coefficients
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Table 4: Determinants of Perceived Ideological Positions of Senators and Sena-
torial Candidates in 2010
All Democrats Republicans
β β β
DW-NOMINATE Score 1.11∗ 0.56 1.36∗ 0.68 0.65∗ 0.57
(0.13) (0.20) (0.15)
CF Score 0.37∗ 0.43 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.21
(0.06) (0.07) (0.13)
(Intercept) -0.02 -0.22∗ 0.39∗
(0.02) (0.06) (0.09)
N 105 59 46
R2 0.95 0.57 0.51
adj. R2 0.95 0.56 0.48
Resid. sd 0.17 0.14 0.15
Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
β are standardized coefficients
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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Figure 1: Mean α Values across Partisan and Ideological Groups in the 2012
American National Election Study
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Figure 2: Ideological Distribution of 2012 American National Election Study
Respondents
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
500
1000
1500
Raw Self−Placements
Liberal−Conservative
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
O R
BAM Ideal Point Estimates
Liberal−Conservative
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Notes: The dark gray bins isolate the estimated ideal points of respondents with positive β values.
“O” and “R” denote the estimated positions of Obama and Romney.
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Figure 3: Overlap of Selected Groups on the Liberal-Conservative Dimension
Democratic and Republican Identifiers (with Leaners)
Overlap Point Estimates with 95% Confidence/Credible Intervals
O
ve
rla
p
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Raw Placements BAM Estimates
l
l
2004
Raw Placements BAM Estimates
l
l
2008
Raw Placements BAM Estimates
l
l
2012
Democratic and Republican Presidential Vote Choice
Overlap Point Estimates with 95% Confidence/Credible Intervals
O
ve
rla
p
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Raw Placements BAM Estimates
l
l
2004
Raw Placements BAM Estimates
l
l
2008
Raw Placements BAM Estimates
l
l
2012
36
Figure 4: Mean Obama Liberal-Conservative Placement (Top Panel) and Mean
Alpha Values (Bottom Panel) by State
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Figure 5: Comparison of Ideological Estimates of Senators and Senatorial Can-
didates in 2010
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